

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM 8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 027 0384 68

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A Resolution and an Order by
Ho Chi Minh3. ISC NUMBER: 708.000; 732.200; 780.000 10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 11 December 1967 13. PREPARED BY: A. L. GALLI, LTC, USA
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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT

15. SUMMARY:

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(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 11 December 1967 and concerns the following subjects: (1) a political meeting held to discuss the development of a "Four-Quality Party Chapter" for the Regiment; (2) the need to reduce defections; (3) a resolution stating that the trend of activities will be unchanged for the coming period; and (4) a report on an order of Ho Chi Minh which directs the SVN Party Committee to launch a general offensive in conjunction with a general uprising, using the entire Army and population in SVN in order to attain a decisive victory in the 1968 Spring-Summer campaign.

(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document which contains information on various topics of concern to the Quyet Tam Regiment [aka 22d Regt, 3d NVA Div] including defections, an order by Ho Chi Minh, a resolution on activities and a political meeting. This document was captured on 11 December 1967 in South Vietnam (BS926387), by 2/8, 1/1st US Air Cav Div. The document was received at CDEC on 8 January 1968 and was summarized under CDEC Document Log Number 01-1333-68 in Bulletin No. 8826 dated 8 January 1968, (IR Number 6 027 0216 68).

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CONTINUATION SHEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0384 68

PAGE 20

OF 30

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

CDEC Doc Log No.01-1333-68

- In these hard conditions, the Party Committee level did not anticipate the need of having close leadership.

- We did not conduct struggle in a strong and timely manner. The Party Chapter assigned separate tasks to cadre which resulted in a decrease in output.

[Page 19 of original text]

From 28 [Oct] to 6 [Nov]: Destroyed 6 battalions and 10 companies 12 November 1967.

Report on the execution of the order of Uncle [Ho Chi Minh] the Party.

General offensive.

The Central Headquarters of the Lao Dong Party recently held a meeting to study the order and arrived at the following agreement:

- Assessment of the situation.

- During the first dry season, the enemy suffered failures in waging their special war. Consequently, they turned it into a limited war.

- After the first dry season, the enemy, in the hope of annihilating our revolutionary forces in South Viet Nam, increased their strength from 130,000 to 200,000 and then to 460,000. The total strength of the puppet troops has reached 1,200,000.

- The enemy has carried out its two pronged attack plan with the foolish intention of pacifying the areas where he lost control and destroying us. But, contrary to all their expectations, they suffered failures and had 180,000 soldiers killed by us.

North Viet Nam:

- In the escalation of the war, the Americans were completely defeated by our forces.

- The Central Headquarters of the Lao Dong Party reached the conclusion that the enemy had not successfully achieved his strategic objectives

- According to the pacification plan, 17000 [hamlet] must be set up. However, only 5 per cent of this norm war fulfilled.

- 80 per cent of Phu Yen and Gia Lai had been pacified by the enemy. However, 80 per cent of Phu Yen was liberated again.

- The monthly [enemy] expenses were from 3 to 90 billion dollars, 3 times as much as the expenses incurred during the Korean war.

Deep dissension among the enemy:

- The French [have told the Americans]: "We were defeated by

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0384 68
PAGE 21 OF 30 PAGES
ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV (CDEC)

CDEC Doc Log No.01-1333-68

(Leave Blank)

the communists after 10 years of fighting. You have been defeated after 20 years. Consequently, you are more stupid than we."

- Due to this aggressive war in SVN, the American negro's, struggle has intensified. Various parties are embarrassed, demoralized and weakened.

- Presently, Johnson's clique is very demoralized. Some of his [Party] members want to stop the war in NVN. Others want to pull the US forces out of SVN. Johnson's reply merely is "yes" to both groups.

McNamara and Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, are now very demoralized. They both ask for a cessation in the bombing of NVN. To them, the bombing will bring no success and makes the North Vietnamese Government more rigid.

[Page 20 of original text]

They recognize that the Viet Nam War has made the American people miserable and enriched the capitalists dealing in gasoline, oil, aircraft and weapons.

A review of forces shows that after the European war, the US Army consisted of 5 [Sic] divisions, the Korean Army was made up of 2 divisions. The US has sent all of its 6 [Sic] divisions to South Viet Nam. However, they can do nothing but suffer failures.

The puppet government tries to "mold" a president and vice-president. However, there is serious dissension between the civilian and military parties. The Americans are making arrangements to prevent a "coup d'Etat". Nevertheless, the situation becomes increasingly critical. Consequently, on the inside, the enemy sought to purge its ranks. On the outside, they are coping with the violent people's resistance movement.

[Former Ambassador] Taylor has complained, "we are seriously wrong in selecting the present objective. A world war no longer exists. Our secret methods have been discovered. We are now unable to conduct rapid and large scale attacks because our force is weak and our strength is insufficient. The more troops we send to SVN, the heavier our losses are. It is not advantageous for us to prolong this war. Due to the fear of Red China, we cannot attack North Viet Nam. Nobody talks about prolonging or shortening the war, peace or negotiations. At present, we have over one million soldiers. Therefore, it would be as bitter as wormwood for us, to be defeated by the enemy". (Eliminate the illusion of peace and bolster our fighting spirit).

For our part,

We have conducted continuous attacks against the enemy and have gained successive and striking victories. Especially at Cai Thi and Gia Lai where our activities were more intensive. Every soldier stationed in Phu Yen only ate one can of rice a day. However, during recent times, 30 per cent of the people have stood up against the enemy to liberate their area. As a result, our troops are now provided with sufficient provisions. The enemy dares not come close to any area where our main force troops are stationed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0384 68
PAGE 22 OF 30 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
COMUSMACV (CDEC)

CDEC Doc Log No.01-1333-68

(Leave Blank)

At present, the enemy is on the defensive. Their forces are concentrated in Quang Nam. They withdrew from 70 strong points to pacify 10 others.

The political movement is being increased everywhere. In various cities, we are prepared to conduct military and political struggles to achieve victories.

[Page 21 of original text]

Some streets in Saigon are entirely under our control.

* The Central [Executive Committee] of the Lao Dong Party came to the conclusion that the time is ripe to directly stage the revolution.

* The opportunity for the General offensive and the General uprising has presented itself.

* The Central [Executive Committee] of the Lao Dong Party and Uncle [Ho Chi Minh] order the South Viet Nam Party Headquarters, the entire army and the entire people of South Viet Nam to carry out the General offensive and the General uprising in order to gain a decisive victory for the revolution during the 1968 Winter-Spring-Summer phase.

* Especially in regards to Region Party Committees, the Region 5 Committee and the Military Region 5 Party Committee must promise the Party that they will be determined to liberate the entire [bullet hole = possibly Military Region] 5 during the Winter-Spring phase.

* Strong, violent attacks must be launched [bullet hole] with the people rising up like a surging wave that carries away everything in its wake. Then, we will establish our administrative control, and [bullet hole = possibly harass] the entire communication line network. Our troops will get ready for movement to the lowlands in order to march forward towards liberating the cities. We must use each regiment division to take over [the liberated areas] on a continuous basis. Propaganda must be conducted far and wide.

Emulation: On the 1st of December, the entire unit will organize a ceremony in commemoration of the "Xuan Son" victory.

Subjects required for discussion.

* What was the situation of the unit prior to embarking upon the mission?

* What is the purpose and significance of that mission?

* How can the entire group [unit] collectively discuss and democratically build up high determination?

* What measures are applied to solve various problems, especially ideological problems, while carrying out the mission?

* How is the sacrificial and courageous fighting spirit of cadre and soldiers?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0384 68
PAGE 23 OF 30 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
COMUSMACV (CDEC)

CDEC Doc Log No.01-1333-68

(Leave Blank)

* How is their spirit of enduring hardships and overcoming difficulties? Answer this from the remaining examples.

* Finally, gain some lessons on the determination of the unit [from the following subjects:].

- The spirit of unconditionally carrying out the mission
- The spirit of violently attacking the enemy and the spirit of maintaining a high degree of secrecy and surprise.
- The spirit of solidarity among cadre and soldiers.
- The spirit of continually enduring hardships.
- The practical attitude of cadre who work among [the people and troops] and the resourcefulness, flexibility and speed of soldiers in action.

* The Party and political task, have a decisive character.

[Page 22 of original text]

17 November 1967

MEETING OF THE CHAPTER PARTY COMMITTEE

[To discuss] three major problems:

1. To approve the preliminary report on the October Resolution
2. To consider a number of applications submitted by Comrades Dap and Tieu.
3. To discuss future leadership tasks. Suggestions will be made to enrich the contents of the October Resolution.

- If tasks are assigned separately, the morale of cadre will be weakened.

The struggle has not been conducted in a strong or timely manner.

- The political task has not been effectively carried out. During the past, the unit was weakened as far as the pride, thoughts and behavior of [cadre and soldiers] were concerned.

- A plan for future activities have not been properly worked out. Therefore, many bad incidents have occurred.

1. The personal history statement and application of civilian Tien [for membership in the Party was considered]. The Chapter Party Committee unanimously recommended that the Party Chapter consider him and submit recommendations to higher echelon to admit civilian Tien into the Party.

2. In considering the personal history statement and application of Civilian Dap. The Chapter Party Committee unanimously recommended that

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CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0384 68

PAGE 24 OF 30

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

CDEC Doc Log No.01-1333-68

the Party Chapter consider them and submit recommendations to higher echelon for the admission of civilian Tien into the Party.

3. In considering the transfer [to official Party membership] of Comrade The, the Chapter Party Committee unanimously recommended that the Party Chapter of Hamlet 135 consider and recommend the transfer of Comrade The.

[Page 23 of original text]

19 November 1967

MEETING OF THE COMMAND COMMITTEE.

- To send Comrades Quyen, Phong and Xuyen to attend the political reorientation courses.

- To work out a plan of action for the next five days
- On the afternoon of 19 November, the Party Chapter met
- To develop technical training for the unit, the regiment will prepare a preliminary report.

Official Party members: 10 Probationary: 3

[Bullet hole] 10
10
10

[Page 24 of original text]

RECAPITULATION OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED THROUGH ONE YEAR OF EMULATION.

SELECTION OF OUTSTANDING EMULATORS AND BRAVE KILLERS OF AMERICANS.

Purpose and Requirement.

1. Point out significant achievements of the past year's emulation campaign.
2. Step up indoctrination in order to promote revolutionary heroism, ethics and pride of a communist, and to motivate the individual to participate in the emulation.
3. Stimulate members to make vigorous efforts in participating in the Winter-Spring campaign. Strengthen the solidarity and increase enthusiasm in order to ferment a new pride within the unit.
4. Make continuous efforts to overcome shortcomings in order to start the campaign with more vigor and energy.

Situation of the Unit.

Through one year of participation in the movement, our unit has

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